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Abstract 
Malingering is the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated symptoms in order to 
obtain an advantage.  Although it has been estimated that over 800,000 claims for personal injury 
in Road Traffic Accidents (RTA) were filed in the UK in 2012, no approximation exists for how 
many involved malingering. This study attempts to understand what influences a psychiatrist to 
conclude that a claimant’s symptoms are not caused by an RTA and thus suggests the claimant is 
malingering. This article describes a study of Personality Assessment Inventory scores alongside 
collateral forms of evidence for 100 RTA claimants; all individuals seeking compensation for 
damages to their mental health. The results suggest that up to 40% of these claims could be cate-
gorised as not being the result of the RTA. Significant differences emerged between those 
claimants diagnosed as having a mental disorder as a result of the RTA and those claimants who 
were classified as not having a mental disorder as a result of the RTA in regards to: employment 
status, level of injuries and scores on the paranoia scales of the PAI. The study emphasises how 
the assessment process is idiosyncratic and in need of further research. 
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Introduction 
It has been suggested that lying is a fundamental aspect of human behaviour (Vrij, 2008; Porter & 
Brinke, 2010) and that, on average, each of us will lie twice a day (DePaulo et al., 1996).  Some 
go as far to suggest that lies are so necessary that, perhaps, without them our social world would 
collapse (Vrij, 2008; Roach, 2010).  This is important if one considers forensic contexts to be rich 
in both motivations and opportunities to lie, with success in deceit arguably the most common 
means by which justice is denied or delayed (Roach, Pease, & Clegg, 2011).  We concern ourselves 
here with the high-stake, fraudulent act of malingering.  Here an individual claims insurance 
compensation for a mental disorder caused by a motoring accident, where it was either not caused 
by the accident, or was never present in the first place.  
Recent estimates suggest fraud costs United Kingdom (UK) insurers as much as £2.1 billion per 
annum (NFA, 2013).  Malingering refers to the “intentional production of false or grossly exag-
gerated symptoms motivated by external incentives” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, 
p.726).  Given that a high percentage of people who have been involved in accidents now claim 
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for personal injury (Transport Committee, 2013), malingering affords a highly lucrative and 
alternative avenue for potential fraudsters to exploit.  Surprisingly, research on malingering in 
insurance claims is limited.  The present study attempts to understand what factors may lead a 
forensic psychiatrist to conclude that a Road Traffic Accident (RTA) is not the cause of a claim-
ant’s mental disorder using the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) (Morey, 1991).  Presented 
within this article is a first attempt by researchers to offer an overview of how practitioners might 
approach the task of detecting malingered mental disorders following an RTA.  Indeed, this is an 
important subject to research considering that the UK Government has recently highlighted the 
increasing issue of malingering with regard to whiplash claims in motor accidents (Transport 
Committee, 2013).  This can be partly seen by examining government statistics which indicate 
that, between 2006 and 2011, the number of reported RTAs fell by 20%, whilst at the same time 
there was a 60% rise in RTA personal injury claims (Merton et al., 2013).  
From an estimated 819,137 personal injury claims following RTAs in 2012, 58% referred to 
whiplash, with the remaining claims being for more severe physical injuries and damages to an 
individual’s mental health (Transport Committee, 2013).  Although whiplash is considered a less 
severe type of physical injury, which most commonly occurs as a result of a collision, there does 
not currently exist a definitive diagnostic test for this.  This may go some way towards explaining 
why, despite estimates indicating that the number of fraudulent and exaggerated claims are very 
high, the average pay-out per claim is relatively low at £2,500 (Transport Committee, 2013).  
Cumulatively, whether lots of relatively small fraudulent claims exist or fewer large ones might 
make little difference to the total cost to the insurance industry.  
When compared with claims for whiplash, damages to mental health appear to have a much higher 
pay out.  A simple search of financial compensation success stories gives some indication in the 
difference between mental-health claims and whiplash claims, with some mental-health “success 
stories” indicating financial compensation in the region of £100,000 for a claim for post-traumatic-
stress disorder accompanied by a loss of earnings.   
Such findings have led researchers to explore the issue of malingering following an RTA through 
an examination of the UK public perception.  Indeed, a number of particularly concerning findings 
emerged, which reinforces the need for research in this area to understand how professionals detect 
malingering in practice.  It was revealed in Cartwright and Roach’s (2016) research that as much 
as 25% of individuals would be likely to exaggerate genuine symptoms of mental disorder for 
additional financial compensation (partial malingering) (Cartwright & Roach, 2016).  Fur-
thermore, 21% of participants alluded that they would be likely to attribute genuine symptoms of 
mental disorder to an RTA, knowing that the RTA was not responsible for their mental disorder 
(false imputation).  In addition, the research evidenced that the disorder to be hypothetically 
malingered did not significantly affect the participants’ stated intentions; thus malingering is no 
more likely to occur in whiplash claims than in PTSD, for example.  Indeed, this presents a variety 
of implications for forensic psychiatrists and psychologists who are charged with the assessment 
of mental disorder following an RTA.  Cartwright and Roach’s (2016) research evidences that 
malingering following an RTA is perceived with little severity and, as a result, it is argued here 
that it is likely to occur in practice significantly more than one believes.  
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Establishing fraud base-rates for motor accident claims, whether for whiplash or mental disorder 
is, however, problematic.  The approach taken by Cartwright and Roach (2016) offers a different 
insight into the likely extent of malingering within practice and the results generated indeed sup-
port different approaches to estimating the likely occurrence.  Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, and 
Condit (2002) surveyed a sample of clinicians about their experience with malingering claimants 
and estimated that, in approximately 29% of personal injury cases, the claimant was thought to be 
malingering.  Although a review of the extent to which malingering occurs in different situations 
is not provided here, research indicates that the rate at which malingering occurs differs according 
to the context in which an individual is claiming mental disorder (Mittenberg et al., 2002; Aronoff 
et al., 2007).  
In the current article, it is hypothesised that clinicians find it hard to spot or refute fraudulent or 
exaggerated symptoms of mental disorder because (as with whiplash complaints) the system is 
very much reliant of self-reported symptoms.  Although admirably sympathetic, the system is, 
however, in our opinion, unbalanced, leaving itself wide open to claims by malingerers feigning 
(or exaggerating) mental disorder, arguably, even more so than it is to fraudulent claims for 
whiplash injuries.  In sum, we posit that the system has so few checks and balances that it is par-
ticularly attractive to the individual prepared to malinger.  As a result, this article seeks to offer an 
insight into how claimants are assessed following their involvement in an RTA.  
Spotting the malingerer? 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM–5; American Psychi-
atric Association (APA, 2013) is one avenue to which professionals have turned in order to help 
identify malingerers.  According to Rogers (2008), even though the DSM-5 has more often than 
not been used by clinicians to diagnose malingering, it has been shown to misclassify over 80% of 
malingerers (Rogers & Vitacco, 2002).   
The DSM-5 (APA, 2013) description of malingerers characterises a criminological model with 
which malingering is committed by an “antisocial person” (Rogers, 2008).  Hall and Hall (2006) 
suggest that malingerers often show some signs of Axis II traits or some kind of Personality Dis-
order.  In addition, Polatin et al., (1993) and Mannion, Dolan, and Adams, (1996) highlight that 
individuals with certain personality types or psychiatric disorders are more likely to exhibit 
symptom magnification.  Although, to date, research investigating malingering has been equivocal 
with its support of the premise that Antisocial Personality Disorder facilitates malingering (e.g. 
Rogers, 1990; Kucharski et al., 2006; McDermott & Sokolov, 2009; Poythress, Edens, & Watkins, 
2001).  
The ease of spotting malingerers can indeed be inhibited by the type of malingering the individual 
in question is demonstrating.  Resnick (1977) has suggested three types of malingering: pure 
malingering, partial malingering, and false imputation.  Pure malingering occurs when the indi-
vidual fabricates symptoms.  Partial malingering occurs when the individual exaggerates real 
symptoms that are experienced.  False imputation, on the other hand, is where an individual 
accurately reports symptoms but knowingly attributes the cause of the symptoms to an event that 
actually played no role.  It is suggested that partial malingering is the most common form 
(Kleinman & Stewart, 2004).  What is important to note here is that the ease of spotting malin-
gering may depend on the type being displayed.  Hall and Hall (2006) suggested that partial 
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malingering and false imputation are much harder to detect due to the individual often having 
direct experience of the symptoms that he is reporting.  
To use a variety of forms of evidence is consistently viewed as the best method in spotting 
malingered psychopathology (Resnick, West, & Payne, 2008, pp. 123).  Though, within the per-
sonal injury arena, aspects of evidence which could be highly useful, such as a claimant’s previous 
medical history or previous claim behaviour, may be missed due to a lack of data-sharing among 
all parties concerned (Transport Committee, 2013).  In general, psychological and psychiatric 
experts may additionally use a psychometric assessment tool in combination with a structured 
clinical interview.  
To summarise, despite the high estimates of fraudulent claims, there is a paucity of research that 
examines fraudulent mental disorder claims as a result of motoring accidents.  The present study 
represents a first attempt to address this neglect by presenting an empirical descriptive study of a 
sample of individuals claiming financial compensation for mental disorder caused by an RTA.  
The present article investigates the methods utilised in practice and asks the question “How well 
equipped are medico-legal examiners in detecting malingered mental disorder?”  Consequently, it 
is hoped that, by trying to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of assessment within this 
arena, progress can be made with regard to deterring and identifying fraudulent claims. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants  
The participants included within this article consist of 100 RTA claimants, 47% of whom were 
female and 53% were male with a mean age of 39 years (SD = 11.0; Range = 14 - 63).  All par-
ticipants were referred to a consultant forensic psychiatrist between 2009 and 2013 for an 
assessment of the psychological impact of the RTA.  Prior to assessment, each participant gave 
written consent for his or her anonymised details to be used for research purposes.  From what was 
known (85% of the cases), the mean time spent in education by participants was 12 years (SD = 
2.6; Range = 8 - 19).  Of this group, 37% were married, 33% single, 27% divorced and 3% fitted 
into the category labelled other.  In terms of employment, 86% of individuals were employed at 
the time of the accident.  Of the participants, 61% had received minor physical injuries as a result 
of the accident and 39% could be classified as having complex injuries involving hospitalisation. 
Procedure 
Out of the 100 cases, the participants were split using the forensic psychiatrist’s decision regarding 
whether the individual’s psychological state was caused by the RTA.  Out of the 100 cases, 60% 
were coded for the analysis as suspected genuine claimants and the other 40% were labelled not 
attributable to the RTA (NATTR).  Within the 40 NATTR claims, four claimants were included 
as they were labelled by the psychiatrist as clearly malingering.  Thereby, these individuals had no 
symptoms of mental disorder and were just attempting to feign symptoms (pure malingering).  A 
further 28 claimants were included based on the fact that the psychiatrist concluded that the 
disorder that they were claiming to have was not initiated by the RTA.  Rather, these individuals 
were vulnerable to mental disorder and, regardless of whether the individual had the accident or 
not, the individual would have had a past of psychological problems.  Subsequently, these 
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individuals could not be classified as having a genuine mental disorder caused by the accident.  
The remaining eight claimants of the NATTR group contained individuals who could not be 
diagnosed by the forensic psychiatrist as having a genuine mental disorder caused by the accident 
but were not obviously malingering.  Therefore, on the basis the psychiatrist could not classify 
these claims as having a genuine mental disorder caused by the RTA, these claims were included 
in the NATTR group.  Furthermore, the rationale for splitting the claimants into the two 
aforementioned groups is based on the fact that the forensic psychiatrist’s task was to determine 
whether the claimants’ reported mental disorder was attributable to the RTA. 
The forensic psychiatrist’s decision for each claimant was based on a variety of evidence that shall 
now be described.  The evidence used to generate a decision often consisted of three psychometric 
assessment tools:  The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI, Morey, 2007; the Trauma 
Symptom Inventory (TSI, Briere et al., 1995); and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II, Beck 
et al., 1961).  Alongside psychometric assessments, the psychiatrist conducted structured 
interviews with the claimants and examined collateral evidence provided by the instructing party.  
Consequently, this was the evidence utilised to construct the expert witness report for the 
instructing party.  It is important to reiterate here that the diagnoses given by the forensic psychi-
atrist are not being argued to be wholly accurate due to the vulnerabilities that have been outlined 
in articles relating to clinical judgment (Neal & Grisso, 2014; Murrie et al., 2013).  Rather, this 
article is concerned with the methods utilised by this professional to construct a diagnosis in an 
arena where malingering is of concern.  
Materials 
The present study used the information from the PAI (Morey, 1991), which all claimants com-
pleted.  In addition to the PAI, various demographic information and information about the indi-
viduals’ claims were coded to be used in the analysis.  The PAI itself consists of 344 Likert-type 
items that require the individual to respond by endorsing either:  false, not at all true, slightly true, 
mostly true, or very true.  Out of the 344 questions, 22 non-overlapping scales emerge, which 
assess the validity of the claimant’s responses, clinical interpretations of the individual’s 
responses, interpersonal attributes of the individual’s personality, and scales which predict treat-
ment complications (Morey, 2007).  In addition, the PAI includes supplementary scales that can 
be useful within various contexts.  For example the PAI includes a specific malingering scale 
(MAL; Morey, 1996), and the Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF; Rogers et al., 1996), which is 
also used for detecting malingering.   
Research evaluating the use of the PAI in general has received a mixed conclusion.  Some research 
provides support using certain validity indicators to detect malingering (e.g. Liljequist, Kinder, & 
Schinka, 1998; Scragg, Bor, & Mendham, 2000; Sullivan & King, 2010; Morey, 1996), whilst 
some articles suggests otherwise (e.g. Calhoun et al., 2000; Liljequist, et al., 1998).  Hawes & 
Boccaccini (2009) conducted a meta-analytic review of the PAI validity scales for detecting over-
reported psychopathology.  Hawes and Boccaccini (2009) indicated that simulation methods of 
malingering research achieved a higher overall effect size in comparison to criterion research 
methods across the three validity scales, thus indicating that the PAI is less effective in ecologically 
valid studies.  
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Analysis 
Alongside descriptive statistics, independent samples t tests and chi square analyses were 
employed to examine whether any group differences emerged among the NATTR group and those 
diagnosed by the psychiatrist as having a mental disorder as a result of the RTA.  It was 
hypothesised that significant differences would emerge between the two groups that would be 
indicative of the psychiatrist’s decision making.  In addition, Cohen’s d effect sizes were cal-
culated. 
Results 
Inferential statistics were first conducted using the demographic data displayed in Table One.  This 
was done in order to examine whether the two groups of claimants could be distinguished using 
demographic data alone.  An independent samples t-test was conducted to examine whether any 
differences were present based on the claimants’ ages.  No significant difference emerged between 
the suspected genuine (M = 40, SD = 10.7) and the NATTR (M = 36, SD = 11.4) groups in terms 
of age t (92) = 1.80, p = .08, d = 0.36.  In terms of the claimants’ gender, a chi-square test of 
independence revealed no relation between gender and the grouping of the claimants (genuine or 
NATTR), χ 2 (1, N = 100) = 2.42, p = .12.  An independent samples t-test revealed that, in the 
cases in which it was possible to extract the level of the claimants’ education, there was no 
significant difference between the suspected genuine group (M = 11.6, SD = 2.6) and the NATTR 
group (M = 11.9, SD = 2.6) in the years of education that they had completed t (83) = .46, p = .65, 
d = - 0.12.    
An important variable to consider in the present analysis was the claimants’ employment status at 
the time of the RTA.  The chi-square analysis revealed a significant difference between the two 
groups, χ2 (1, N = 100) = 10.09, p = .001, indicating significantly higher numbers of unem-
ployment in the NATTR group as opposed to those diagnosed with having a mental disorder as a 
result of the RTA.  A further chi-square test was undertaken to measure whether any differences 
were present between the two groups in terms of the type of injuries the claimants had suffered.  
Claimants were categorised by the psychiatrist as either having a minor injury as a result of the 
RTA or a severe injury.  A significant chi-square test, χ2 (1, N = 100) = 5.49, p = .02, revealed a 
higher occurrence of minor injuries were found in the NATTR group as opposed to the genuine 
group.  It is important to acknowledge at this point that, in terms of the types of mental disorder 
diagnosed or attested by the claimant, a wide variety of conditions were observed with many 
claimants presenting high levels of psychiatric co-morbidity. 
A further area of interest from the data displayed in Table One was to examine whether the amount 
of time between the date of the accident and the date of the psychiatric assessment differed between 
the two groups.  An independent sample t-test revealed that the NATTR group had a longer period 
of time between the accident and the assessment (M = 1433, SD = 465.1) than the genuine group 
(M = 1285, SD = 437.0).  This, however, did not reach a significant level, t (98) =1.61, p = .11, d 
= 0.33.  The final area for exploration using the data displayed in Table One relates to whether 
claimants differed in having returned back to work at the time of the examination.  A chi-square 
test was conducted and no significant difference emerged between the two groups, χ2 (1, N = 100) 
= 1.79, p = .18.  
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Detailed in Table 1.0 is the general demographic profile of the individuals within each group of 
the present study that may be of use to other medico-legal examiners. 
 
Personality Assessment Inventory 
The study analysed the PAI scores to examine whether there were any differences between the two 
groups on the PAI that would be indicative of why they were attributed to one group of claimants 
as opposed to the other.  As recommended by Morey (2007), individuals at this stage of the analysis 
who scored greater than 73 on the INC validity scale and higher than 75 on the INF scale were 
excluded.  Excluding these individuals allows for the assumption that the claimants completing 
the PAI were answering the PAI questions consistently and accurately.  
As Table Two highlights, there was a significant difference found between the NATTR group (M 
= 56.9) and the suspected genuine group (M = 50.9) on the scores they obtained on the paranoia 
scale, thus demonstrating that the NATTR group scored significantly higher on the paranoia scale 
than the suspected genuine group.  No significant differences, however, were found on the further 
ten clinical scales, the six validity scales or the two interpersonal scales of the PAI (p = .052 – 
.879).  
Table 1.0: Demographic information for genuine claimants and 
those whose mental disorder was not attributable to the RTA 
(NATTR) 
  
NATTR 
 
Suspected Genuine 
 
Age  
 
 
M = 36  
 
M = 40  
Gender 
 
62.5% male 53% female 
Years in education  
 
11.9  11.6  
Employed at the time of the 
accident  
 
72.5% 95% 
Not returned to work by the 
time of the examination 
 
77.5% 65% 
Marital status 
Married 
Single  
Divorced 
Other 
 
37.5% 
30.0% 
25.0% 
7.5% 
 
36.7% 
35.0% 
28.3% 
Minor injuries 62.5% 48.3% 
Days between accident and 
psychiatric examination 
 
1432.95 1285.33 
NATTR Group N= 40 Suspected Genuine Group N= 60. 
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After analysing the PAI scores in general, the study explored the paranoia subscales, as the Para-
noia scale scores were significantly different between the two groups.  Detailed in Table Three are 
the results of the independent samples t tests, which were conducted for the paranoia subscales:  
Hypervigilance, Persecution, and Resentment.  As can be seen in Table Three, the suspected 
NATTR (M = 54.2) group scored significantly higher than the genuine group (M = 49.4) on the 
PAR-H subscale.  A similar finding was also apparent on the PAR-P subscale with NATTR 
claimants (M = 54.0) obtaining significantly higher scores than the genuine claimants (M = 49.3).  
With regards to the PAR-R scale, the NATTR claimants (M = 60.0) once again scored significantly 
higher than the suspected genuine claimants (M = 54.2). 
 
 
 
	
Table 2.0: Independent sample T-tests results between the two groups of 
claimants on the PAI 
 
 
PAI Scale 
 
NATTR  T-Score 
 
Genuine T-Score 
 
t 
 
P 
 
d 
 M SD M SD    
 
ICN 
 
53.3 
 
7.7 
 
54.7 
 
9.4 
 
-.79 
 
.43 
 
-.11 
INF 56.0 8.8 54.2 8.6 -.95 .35 .21 
NIM  62.8 15.5 60.4 12.2 -.85 .40 .20 
PIM 47.4 13.0 46.7 13.1 -.26 .80 .05 
MAL 54.3 13.9 60.0 13.7 1.97 .05 -.41 
RDF 51.8 13.8 48.8 14.4 -1.03 .31 .21 
        
SOM 73.3 13.7 68.6 8.8 -1.91 .06 .41 
DEP 78.0 15.7 79.6 17.4 -.46 .65 -.10 
ANX 66.9 16.5 66.0 15.3 -.29 .78 .06 
ARD 67.2 17.5 66.7 14.6 -.15 .88 .03 
MAN 47.4 10.0 44.8 10.8 -1.17 .24 .25 
PAR 56.9 12.4 50.9 9.4 -2.69 .01 .55 
SCZ 61.8 16.6 58.3 10.1 -1.25 .21 .26 
ANT 47.5 8.5 45.9 7.7 -.92 .36 .20 
BOR 60.8 13.6 59.0 11.1 -.74 .46 .15 
DRG 52.2 10.5 49.6 6.8 -1.30 .20 .29 
ALC 49.9 10.8 47.0 8.7 -1.42 .16 .30 
        
WRM 45.3 12.7 47.4 11.0 .84 .40 -.21 
DOM 
 
44.9 13.9 47.1 10.9 .88 .38 -.18 
N= NATTR 39, N= 55 Suspected Genuine.  PAI scale abbreviations: Negative Impression 
Management (NIM),Positive Impression Management, Infrequency (INF), Inconsistency (INC), 
Malingering Index (MAL), Rogers Discriminative Function (RDF), Somatic Complaints (SOM), 
Depression (DEP), Anxiety (ANX), Anxiety Related Disorder (ARD), Mania (MAN), Paranoia 
(PAR), Schizophrenia (SCZ), Antisocial Features (ANT), Borderline Features (BOR), Drug 
Problems (DRG), Alcohol Problems (ALC), warmth (WRM) and Dominance (DOM). 
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Table 3.0: Mean scores for the paranoia subscale in the suspected genuine and the not 
attributable to the RTA groups, using the T-test. 
 
 
PAI Sub- Scale 
 
NATTR T Scores 
 
Genuine T Score 
 
t 
 
P 
 
d 
 M SD M SD    
 
PAR-H ‘Hypervigilance’ 
 
54.2 
 
11.7 
 
49.4 
 
 
9.9 
 
2.14 
 
.04 
 
0.43 
PAR-P ‘Persecution’ 
 
54.0 11.2 49.3 9.6 2.17 .03 0.45 
PAR-R ‘Resentment’ 
 
60.0 14.1 54.2 10.8 2.24 .03 0.46 
 NATTR Group N=39, Suspected Genuine Group N=55.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A further area to explore was the usefulness of the PAI validity scales for detecting exaggeration 
and malingering in the two groups of claimants.  As can be seen in Table Four, the percentage of 
claimants that could be categorised into the two groups according to the cut-off scores suggested 
in the PAI manual (Morey, 2007) was low. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The present article raises many important concerns for those charged with assessing the veracity 
of RTA claimants.  The key finding raised here is that very few significant differences emerged 
between those who were diagnosed as having a genuine mental disorder following an RTA and 
those categorised as having no disorder attributable to the RTA.  As a result, the findings of this 
article suggest that the decisions made by the psychiatrist must have been made based on different 
evidence, as the PAI only discriminated between claimants in regard to their scores on the PAR 
scale.  Thus, it could be argued that the assessment method employed is idiosyncratic due to being 
based on the experience and opinion of the examiner due to the absence of a robust detection 
technique. 
	 Table 4.0: Percentage of claimants within each group 
scoring higher than the PAI validity scale cut off scores 
according to the PAI manual (Morey, 2007) 
 
 
PAI validity scales  
Groups 
Genuine 
N=55 
 
NATTR 
N=39 
 
NIM >73T 20% 25.6% 
MAL >84T 14.5% 10.3% 
RDF >59T 16.4% 28.2% 
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The present study utilised the psychiatrist’s final decision as a criterion variable with which to 
distinguish genuine claims of mental disorder from those that were not caused by the RTA and, 
although it is acknowledged that this is far from reliable and at risk of being dismissed as being 
too “circular,” the authors are not aware of any other means by which the decision-making of 
assessors in such cases can be explored.  On a more positive note, the present study does provide 
some insight into which factors may have contributed to the formation of the forensic psychiatrist’s 
decision.  Furthermore, on a basic level, simply describing the diagnostic outcome of the 100 RTA 
claimants assessed in this study should be of particular interest to other medico-legal examiners.  
Future research would prove to be beneficial by providing a more thorough understanding of the 
differing types of symptoms and disorders displayed by claimants and diagnosed by practitioners.   
Consistent with Resnick’s (1977) suggestion that there appears to be three different patterns of 
malingering, the data used in this article empirically supports such claims.  Out of the 100 RTA 
claims, 4% of the claimants could be classified as fitting the category suggested by Resnick (1977) 
as using a pure malingering strategy.  The highest proportion of claims that were categorised as 
NATTR were submitted by individuals labelled in this study as vulnerable, which could be argued 
to reflect the strategies of partial malingering and false imputation.  Having said this, it is essential 
for further research to explore the demographics of such claimants in further detail since, from the 
data used in this study, it was not possible to explore these claimants in further detail.  Due to the 
imbalance of claimants included in the present study, whereby only 4% were suspected of pure 
malingering and 28% were suspected of malingering potentially through a partial malingering or 
a false imputation strategy, it wasn’t deemed possible to statistically examine the efficacy of the 
PAI validity indicators in detecting the different strategies of malingering.  Future research would 
be encouraged to overcome this limitation.  In addition, it is also important to reiterate that those 
who were labelled “vulnerable to mental disorder” by the psychiatrist in the present study indeed 
may not have been consciously malingering at all.  There may have been a variety of reasons for 
why they were attesting that the RTA caused their current disorder, or it may be the case that the 
RTA exacerbated their symptoms.  However, from the data utilised within this article, it was 
impossible to investigate this further.  Future research adopting a differing methodology is 
certainly warranted.  Nonetheless, for the purpose of this article, the aforementioned claimants’ 
mental disorders were not attributable to the RTA according to the psychiatrist and thus were dealt 
with in this way during the analysis.  
Finding only one significant difference on the PAI demonstrates that the PAI and assessments like 
it should not be used as the only source of assessment in order to consider the possible presence 
of malingering.  This study argues that psychometric assessments must only be used as an adjunct 
to a detailed clinical interview and full consideration of collateral and background information.  
Had the psychiatrist only used the PAI, claimants included in the present sample as not having a 
mental disorder attributable to the RTA would have simply been missed and thus may have 
received high amounts of compensation, which they did not necessarily warrant.  This is an 
important finding, considering that the PAI has three dedicated exaggeration scales (MAL, RDF, 
& NIM).  However, when viewing claimants as either having a mental disorder attributable to the 
RTA or not having a mental disorder attributable to the RTA, these were ineffective.  As a result, 
this indicates that, perhaps, viewing claimants in such a way is not appropriate; future research 
investigating the three levels of malingering specifically would be useful.  Although the PAI has 
dedicated scales for detecting malingering, the assessment is not a dedicated test for malingering.  
Such tests do exist but to the authors’ knowledge no empirical tests of such instruments have been 
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conducted within a similar arena.  Future research would prove beneficial employing a dedicated 
malingering assessment such as the SIRS 2 or the M-Fast to first corroborate the assessor’s 
decision and second to assess whether such tests would be better equipped to assist examiners.  
What the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) argues is that a malingerer is essentially a deceptive and antisocial 
individual who may be bordering on an antisocial personality disorder.  The findings of this article 
certainly do not support this theory empirically.  The PAI allows for the examination of antisocial 
features of an individual’s personality and consequently no significant differences were found 
between genuine claimants and those who were suspected of malingering due to their attested 
mental disorder not being the result of the RTA.  Whilst it is probably the case that individuals 
with traits associated with antisocial personality disorder might be more likely to feign symptoms 
for a financial reward, it is also probably the case that many individuals who are prepared to 
exaggerate the extent of their injuries in an insurance claim are not necessarily antisocial in other 
respects.  Consequently, the criminological model of malingering suggested by the DSM-5 is not 
supported here and thus provides evidence that perhaps the adaptational model suggested by 
Rogers (2008) is a more robust explanation of malingering.  Essentially, Rogers (2008) argues that 
individuals malinger to make the best of a bad situation through a cost-benefit analysis and rational 
choice.  The results of this article would seem to support this theory and thus the implication 
suggested here is that the information given in the DSM to guide practitioners regarding 
malingering is potentially not useful and in need of revision.  
Two significant differences did, however, emerge between the two groupings of claimants based 
on the demographic information and claims-related data.  The suspected malingering group, whose 
mental disorder was not attributable to the RTA, were significantly more likely to have incurred 
minor injuries than those diagnosed as having a disorder as a result of the RTA.  Consequently, 
this would suggest that claimants who receive minor injuries are more likely to be classified as 
malingerers than claimants who have incurred more serious injuries.  This may possibly be due to 
the simple reason that more serious physical injuries are a sure pay-out, whereas the claimant who 
has incurred less serious injures has not had as much of an opportunity to present injuries that can 
be compensated and thus may engage in a malingering strategy.  Previous research has indicated 
that this financial pressure is an important contributor to the commission of malingering (Rohling, 
Binder, & Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 1995; Miller, 1976); the findings of the present article support 
this as there were significantly more unemployed claimants within the suspected malingering 
group.  
A further area where the two groups of claimants significantly differed was on the paranoia scale 
of the PAI.  The paranoia scale and its subscales are suggested to be useful in assessing the level 
of trust which an individual is likely to approach in life circumstances; the PAR-R and the PAR-
H sub-scales measure bitterness, hostility, and a tendency to distrust others (Morey & Hopwood, 
2006).  Therefore, individuals who score higher on these scales are likely to demonstrate the 
aforementioned personality constructs.  Therefore, we hypothesise that elevated paranoia scales in 
RTA claimants, particularly the resentment scale (PAR-R), may reflect the claimant’s attitude 
towards the party “responsible” for causing the RTA.  This consequently may explain, in part, an 
individual’s decision in choosing to exaggerate his or her symptoms as the claimant wishes to 
persecute the party they believe to be responsible for his or her suffering.  This is something that 
future research is encouraged to explore, as scholars have attested that rationalisations are a per-
tinent component in theories of fraudulent criminal behaviour (e.g. Cressey, 1953).  
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A final area that is important to acknowledge is the limitations arising from the sampling technique 
used in this article.  This article is by no means suggesting that the findings of this paper are 
representative to RTA assessments in the UK as the findings are simply based on the decision of 
one forensic examiner.  It is more the case that this article has sought to offer a descriptive insight 
into how such claimants are assessed in practice.  It is essential that future research seek to 
overcome this limitation.  
The present study indeed provides important insights into some of the key factors, which may lead 
a medico-legal examiner using similar methods of assessment to conclude that an RTA is not the 
cause of a claimant’s declared mental disorder.  As documented throughout, the main limitation of 
this study is that, without the use of a gold-standard criterion variable, identifying malingers from 
a sample such as the present one is an impossible task.  This therefore reiterates the main 
conclusion of this study:  investigating mental disorder claims in which there exists a clear motive 
to be dishonest is a confounded task that requires substantial and ecologically valid research.  
Therefore, future research should work collaboratively with forensic professionals in order to 
understand the limitations of psychometric assessment tools such as the PAI and how professionals 
arrive at their conclusions.  Consequently, future research should examine the clinical interview in 
order to offer further insights into the determination of malingering, with the aim of reducing the 
amount of claims that possibly go undetected each year, resulting in a huge loss to the economy.  
Undoubtedly, this article has shone light on a previously under-studied area and the authors of the 
present article invite scholars and practitioners to draw conclusions as to whether the assessment 
of mental disorder in this arena is appropriate.  Future articles critiquing the assessment methods 
as opposed to descriptively portraying the process would certainly be beneficial.  On a simplistic 
level, the present article has offered descriptive statics that may be of use to practitioners working 
in this arena. 
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